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Nestling brood parasites vary in the harm that they do to their companions in the nest. Here we use a game-theoretical model to
attempt to account for this variation. Our model considers hosts that might routinely abandon single nestlings, regardless of
whether they are host young or brood parasites and choose instead to reallocate their reproductive effort to future breeding. The
nestling brood parasite must decide whether or not to kill all host young by balancing the benefits it stands to gain from reduced
competition in the nest against the risk of desertion by host parents. The model predicts that 3 different types of evolutionarily
stable strategies can exist. 1) When hosts routinely rear depleted broods, the brood parasite always kills host young, and the host
never then abandons the nest. 2) Conversely, when adult survival after deserting single offspring is very high, hosts always
abandon broods of one young, and the parasite never kills host offspring. 3) Intermediate strategies can also be evolutionarily
stable, in which parasites sometimes kill their nest mates, and host parents sometimes desert nests that contain only a single
chick. We provide quantitative descriptions of how the values given to ecological and behavioral parameters of the host-parasite
system influence the probability of each strategy and compare our results with host–brood parasite associations seen in nature.
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The obligate avian brood parasites lay their eggs in nestsbelonging to other species, and their victims then care for
the parasitic offspring by incubating the egg and feeding the
nestling (Davies 2000). This habit of exploitation is now
thought to have evolved 6 times independently within the
birds: in the old world cuckoos, the Clamator cuckoos, the
new world cuckoos, the honeyguides, the Vidua finches, and
the cuckoo-finch, Anomalospiza imberbis, and 5 species of cow-
bird (Sorenson and Payne 2002). The reproductive biology of
these 100 or so brood parasites is broadly similar between
species, but the behavior of their chicks differs in one key
respect. Soon after hatching, the old world cuckoos, some of
the new world cuckoos, and the honeyguides deliberately kill
the (host) young with whom they share the nest, either by
evicting them from the nest or by using their hooked bills
to inflict lethal injuries (Davies 2000). In the remaining spe-
cies, however, brood parasitic young are more benign and at
least one of their companions in the nest commonly survives
to fledge. Although these brood parasites can be responsible
for the death of some host young, often because they outcom-
pete them for food, it is not clear whether their effect on host
mortality is strategic or accidental. Redondo (1993) suggests
that great spotted cuckoo, Clamator glandarius, chicks raised in
magpie, Pica pica, nests strategically beg at dishonestly high
rates to hasten the starvation of the magpie chicks with whom
they are reared. By contrast, the success of cowbird nestlings
in outcompeting host young seems to be an accident of their
relatively large size (e.g., Hauber 2003a; Lichtenstein and
Dearborn 2004).
How can we account for such marked variation between
species in the virulence of brood parasitic young? One ap-
proach is to suggest that destroying potential rivals for host
resources is generally beneficial for the parasitic nestling, and
so the species that lack this capability stand to gain no benefits
by killing host young (because host young are not rivals for
food e.g., Soler 2002), are suffering from evolutionary lag, or
are constrained in some way, perhaps by the relatively large size
of host young (Grim 2006c). The evidence for evolutionary lag
initially seems compelling because the brood parasites belong-
ing to more recently evolved lineages (the parasitic cowbirds
and finches, Sibley and Ahlquist 1990) also tend to be those
that lack offspring-killing behaviors (Davies 2000). However,
there are exceptions to this rule, which suggest that it cannot
fully account for the observed distribution of host killing across
brood parasitic species. For example, the brown-headed cow-
birdMolothrus atermay at times strategically evict host offspring
from the nest (Dearborn 1996). Furthermore, 2 old world
cuckoo species, the Asian koel Eudynamis scolopacea and the
channel-billed cuckoo Scythrops novaehollandiae seem to have
secondarily lost the capacity to kill young because their closest
living relatives (according to Sorenson and Payne 2005) are
active chick-killers (Payne 2005). The hosts of these cuckoos
are among the largest to be exploited by brood parasites, and it
might be argued, therefore, that these cuckoo chicks simply
lack the physical strength to throw host young from the nest
(Kru¨ger and Davies 2004). However, both common cuckoo,
Cuculus canorus, and Horsfield’s bronze-cuckoo, Chalcites basa-
lis,chicks nestlings are capable of evicting eggs or nestlings of
more than twice their body weight (Payne RB and Payne LL
1998; Davies 2000; Langmore NE and Kilner RM, unpublished
data). Because the Vidua and cowbird hosts are typically far less
than twice the mass of their parasites, it is unlikely that physical
strength alone limits their capacity to kill host young (Kilner
2006). Nest structure may further restrict the ability to kill host
young by eviction but is unlikely to prevent the evolution of
chick-killing by other means (Kilner 2006).
An alternative line of reasoning, and the one that we
explore in this paper, is to consider the possible costs that
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parasitic offspring may experience when they kill nest mates,
which might limit the evolution of host-chick killing (Kilner
2005). Three types of costs might follow from the destruction
of companions in the nest. First, brood parasitic young might
lose kin if their mothers are in the habit of laying repeatedly
in the same host nest (e.g., Martinez et al. 1998). Second, the
parasitic nestling might lose assistance in soliciting care
(Lotem 1998; Kilner 2003; Kilner et al. 2004). Host young
might be beneficial in this regard either because they commu-
nicate more effectively than foreign young with host parents
(Payne et al. 2001) or because collectively a brood of young
birds presents a more potent stimulus to a provisioning parent
than a lone nestling ever can (Kilner et al. 1999). A third
potential cost incurred by killing nest mates is an increased
risk of desertion by the host parents (e.g., Langmore et al.
2003), and this is the focus of our interest here. Specifically,
we wish to construct a mathematical model to explore the
logical plausibility of this factor alone in producing the ob-
served variation in parasite chick behavior. This is not to sug-
gest that we expect this to be the only (or even the dominant)
factor driving this variation but rather that we need to evaluate
its logical feasibility in order to evaluate the usefulness of
future empirical investigation by manipulative experiment
or comparative analysis.
When parasitic young kill all the other offspring in the nest,
they reduce the brood size to one. Host parents may then
choose to desert the parasitic chick, not necessarily as a co-
evolved response to brood parasitism but as part of a life-
history strategy to avoid wasting time and effort raising a single
nestling. According to this view, hosts will desert all unprofit-
able single chick broods, even those containing their own off-
spring. There is ample empirical evidence of desertion of
reduced broods (summarized in Verboven and Tinbergen
2002). If host parents are following this life-history strategy
to maximize their lifetime fitness, then the conditions under
which nest-mate killing will evolve in young brood parasites
become limited. Our aim here is to identify those conditions
by using the evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) approach to
analyze a game between parasites and their hosts. Parasitic
chicks choose whether or not to kill by balancing the benefits
of removing the competition for host resources with the likeli-
hood of subsequent desertion, whereas host parents choose
whether or not to desert by balancing the value of continuing
investment in the current brood against breeding again in the
future. We aim to find the evolutionarily stable combinations
of strategies for the parasite chick (whether or not to kill) and
the host adult (whether or not to desert). Importantly, the
host bird’s decision to desert does not depend on its ability
to recognize the cuckoo chick as foreign [see Grim et al.
(2003) for an example of rejection without recognition]. In-
deed, a fundamental assumption of the game is that the
host cannot tell with certainty whether it has been parasitized
or not.
MODEL DESCRIPTION
We assume a population of parasites preying on a population
of hosts. For each host, the sequence of events is as follows:
1. The host bird forms a nest and lays a clutch of eggs.
2. The number of offspring in the nest can be reduced to 1
by either of 2 possible mechanisms. Firstly, a parasitic egg
may be laid in the nest (this happens with probability P),
and the parasitic chick can choose to kill all the other
eggs or chicks (which occurs with probability Cp). Sec-
ondly, the number of chicks can be reduced to 1 by an
external event unconnected with parasitism, such as pre-
dation, which occurs with probability E. It is theoretically
possible that both these events could occur for the same
clutch, when the order of events would be important.
However, if the occurrence of parasitism and of such
external events is rare, then the probability of both
events occurring is very small, and for the sake of sim-
plicity, we shall assume this is so and that only one of
these events can occur. Thus, with probability E 1 PCp,
the brood will be reduced to a single individual, with
probability P(1 ! Cp) the brood will be increased by
a single (parasitic) individual beyond its original size,
and with probability 1 ! P ! E, the brood size will remain
unchanged. Although some brood parasite females re-
move a host egg when laying their own, this complication
does not change the conclusions of our model materially
(because we do not assume any number discriminating
ability from host adults other than the ability to differen-
tiate between ‘‘one’’ and ‘‘several’’) and has been left out
to aid clarity and simplicity.
3. The host must choose whether to desert the nest or not.
We assume that the parent cannot detect parasitic eggs
or chicks and cannot accurately detect if it has been
parasitized or not. It can tell only if there is a single chick
in the nest or more than one (perhaps using begging
rate or gape area as indicators).
4. If there is more than one (which could be a full brood of
its own young or a full brood of its own young plus a par-
asite), then it does not desert; if there is a single chick
(which could be its own or a parasite) then it deserts with
probability Ch and does not desert with probability
1 !Ch.
The rewards from a given breeding attempt are described
by a set of 3 parameters; the first is the payoff to the host from
offspring in its nest, the second is the payoff to the parasite,
and the third is the probability of the parent surviving the
winter to breed again next year. There are 6 possibilities, as
defined in Table 1. The table also introduces the remaining
variables needed to fully define the model. We can impose
some limitations on the values taken by these variables on
biological grounds.
We assume that the parasite’s fitness would be higher if it
did not suffer competition from the host chicks. We define /
as the value (to its parent) of a parasite brought up with
a brood of host chicks, relative to one brought up alone, so
we can assume 0 , / , 1 (but see Kilner et al. 2004). We also
assume that competition with the parasite would be detrimen-
tal to host chicks. We define c as the value of a brood of chicks
(to the host parent) brought up with a parasite chick com-
pared with being brought up without the parasite, so 0 , c ,
1. Raising a full brood should be better for the parent than
raising a single one of its chicks. We define B as the value of
a full brood relative to the value of a single host chick and so
Table 1
The rewards from a given breeding attempt, described by a set of
3 parameters: the first is the payoff to the host, the second is the
payoff to the parasite, and the third is the probability of the parent
surviving to breed again
Probability Description Payoff
1 ! P ! E No parasitism occurs B, -, lb
P(1 ! Cp) Parasitism occurs but without ejection cB, /, lbp
ECh A lone host chick is deserted 0, -, ld
E(1 ! Ch) A lone host chick is not deserted 1, -, ls
PCpCh A lone parasite chick is deserted 0, 0, ld
PCp(1 ! Ch) A lone parasite chick is not deserted 0, 1, lp
Notice that where no parasitism occurs, there is no payoff to the
parasite, and so the second element of the set is denoted by a ‘‘-.’’
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B . 1. Implicit assumptions of our fitness measure are that
density dependence acts through juvenile survival alone and
that we interpret the payoffs of 1 and B for one offspring and
the whole brood, respectively, to be proportional to survival
(with the constant of proportionality depending on other pa-
rameters through density dependence).
The greatest chance of host adult overwinter survival is
given by desertion, raising a single chick will certainly not lead
to a greater chance of survival, and may lead to a smaller
chance. In turn, raising a full brood of its own offspring will
not lead to greater survival than raising a single one of these
offspring and may lead to reduced survival. Raising both
a brood and a parasite will not allow greater survival than
raising a full brood and may well reduce survival. From these
assumptions, we get
lbp " lb " ls " ld;
where lbp is the probability of host survival after raising a full
brood and a parasite, lb is the probability of host survival after
raising a full brood, ls denotes the probability of survival after
raising a single host chick, and ld is the probability of host
survival after desertion of the reduced brood.
Similarly, if the parasite chick is larger than a host chick,
raising a single parasite will not increase adult survival com-
pared with raising a single host chick and may well decrease
survival. Finally, raising a parasite alongside a full brood will
not lead to greater survival than raising only a parasite and
may well decrease survival. Thus, we have
lbp " lp " ls " ld;
where lp is the probability of host survival after raising a single
parasite.
One important point about these relations is that we make
no assumptions about the survivorship consequences of raising
a parasite compared with a full brood of host chicks, that is, we
make no assumption about the relative values of lp and lb.
ANALYSIS TO DETERMINE ESSS
We want to find equilibrium strategy pairs (Ch,Cp) where ei-
ther party cannot increase their reward by changing strategy.
We will also look at the stability of any equilibria.
We shall consider the reward R(Ch,Cp) to a host individual
using strategy Ch in a population of parasites all using strategy
Cp and the reward S(Cp,Ch) to a parasite individual using
strategy Cp in a population of hosts using Ch. It is possible
that there is more than one strategy of either host or parasite
present in the population, in which case we must extend the
above notation, as when we check the stability of our solutions
(see Appendix B).
The reward for a parasite (S) is much simpler to calculate
because it is just the reward from a single interaction. It is
given by
SðCp;ChÞ ¼ /ð1!CpÞ1Cpð1! ChÞ ¼/1Cpð1! /! ChÞ: ð1Þ
The reward for the host (R) is more complicated because the
host potentially takes part in a number of different breeding
attempts. So for each case of the current breeding attempt,
the reward is that from the current attempt plus the overall
expected reward from the subsequent attempt multiplied by
the chance of surviving to this next breeding attempt. Thus, if
Ri is the value of the expected reward to a host of age i, we
would obtain an expression in terms of Ri11, its expected re-
ward in the subsequent year. The best strategy would then
depend on the age of the individual. We simplify this by set-
ting Ri ¼ R for all i, and so the expected reward for the sub-
sequent attempt is just R.
Note that our analysis will only work for a stable population.
If population size changes with time, then the value of a brood
depends on when it is raised (e.g., for increasing populations,
an earlier brood is better than a later one) and analysis would
be more complex for any realistic version of such a model,
which would have to have density-dependent rewards. We
would perhaps have to use a simulation model.
Thus,
R ¼ ð1! P ! EÞðB1RlbÞ1Pð1! CpÞðcB1RlbpÞ
1EChldR 1Eð1! ChÞð11 lsRÞ1PCpChldR
1PCpð1! ChÞlpR : ð2Þ
This can be rearranged to give
RðCh;CpÞ ¼ ½ð1! P ! EÞB1PcB1E ! PcBCp ! ECh'=
½1!lb1Pðlb!lbpÞ1Eðlb ! lsÞ1PCpðlbp!lpÞ
1EChðls ! ldÞ1PCpChðlp ! ldÞ':
ð3Þ
For an equilibrium pair ðC*p ;C*h Þ, we need that C*h maximizes
RðCh;C*p Þ and C*p maximizes SðCp;C*h Þ so that in a population
where every host uses strategy C*h and every parasite uses strat-
egy C*p, there is no strategy change by either host or parasite
that can improve fitness.From Equation 1,
SðCp;C*h Þ ¼ /1Cpð1! /! C*h Þ: ð4Þ
By inspection, we can see that if C*h ¼ 1! /, then S is inde-
pendent of Cp. If C*h,1! /, then S is maximized when Cp ¼ 1,
and when C*h.1! /, then S is maximized by Cp ¼ 0.
Thus, this system can have 3 types of equilibrium:
1. One where the parasite always kills ðC*p ¼ 1;C*h,1! /Þ
2. One where the parasite never kills ðC*p ¼ 0;C*h.1! /Þ
3. An intermediate case where all parasitic strategies are
equally successful ð0 " C*p " 1;C*h¼1! /Þ.We can re-
write Equation 3 as
RðCp;ChÞ ¼ a1 bChc1 dCh ; ð5Þ
where
a ¼ ð1! P ! EÞB1PcB1E ! PcBC*p ; ð6Þ
b ¼ !E ; ð7Þ
c ¼ ð1!lbÞ1Pðlb!lbpÞ1Eðlb!lsÞ1Pðlbp!lpÞC*p ; ð8Þ
and
d ¼ Eðls ! ldÞ1PC*p ðlp ! ldÞ: ð9Þ
From this, it is easy to show that
@R
@Ch
¼ bc! adðc1 dChÞ2
: ð10Þ
Thus, if bc . ad, then R increases with Ch and so C*h ¼ 1,
whereas if bc, ad, then R decreases with Ch and so C*h ¼ 0. In
the boundary case where bc ¼ ad, then R is constant for Ch
and any 0 " C*h " 1 is possible.
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In order to make further progress, we need to describe bc –
ad as a polynomial in C*p . With some manipulation it is possi-
ble to show that
bc! ad ¼ G01G1C*p 1G2ðC*p Þ2; ð11Þ
where
G0 ¼ Eð!ð1! lbÞ1Pðlbp ! lbÞ1Eðld ! lbÞ
1Bðld ! lsÞð1! P ! E 1 cPÞÞ; ð12Þ
G1 ¼ ðld ! lbpÞEP 1 ðls ! ldÞPcBE
1 ðld ! lpÞPBð1! P ! E 1 cP Þ; ð13Þ
and
G2 ¼ P 2cBðlp ! ldÞ: ð14Þ
Thus, possible ESS solutions include the case where the par-
asite always evicts host eggs and the host never abandons the
nest ðC*p ¼ 1;C*h ¼ 0Þ. This occurs when bc – ad , 0, that is,
when G0 1 G1 1 G2 , 0.
It is also possible to get solutions where the parasite never
ejects host chicks and the host always abandons the nest if it
has one chick in it ðC*p ¼ 0;C*h ¼ 1Þ. This occurs when bc –
ad . 0, that is, when G0 . 0. The outcome of this strategy in
a real population would be a situation where parasitic chicks
tolerate nest mates, and hosts raise both the parasite and
their own chicks together. The hosts do desert when their
brood size is drastically reduced, but this occurs only
through external events such as predation and not through
chick-killing by parasites.
Cases where C*p equals 1 or 0, but C
*
h does not equal either
0 or 1, require very specific combinations of parameters such
that either G0 ¼ 0 or G01 G11 G2 ¼ 0. It is highly improbable
that any natural system would have exactly the correct combi-
nation of parameter values to give such solutions, so they are
not considered any further.
Hence, we now turn to intermediate solutions where C*p is
neither 0 nor 1, that is, where 0 , C*p ,1. For this, we need
C*h ¼ 1! /: ð15Þ
This can only occur if bc – ad ¼ 0. That is, solutions of the
form ð0 , C*p ,1;C*h ¼ 1! /Þ can only occur at the roots of
G01G1C
*
p 1G2ðC*p Þ2 ¼ 0: ð16Þ
At first sight, Equations 15 and 16 also appear to require a pre-
cise coincidence of parameters. However, satisfying Equations
15 and 16 is not implausible biologically in the same way as
above because they involve the strategies played by the birds
themselves, and natural selection may cause the strategies in
the population to evolve to such particular values. We define
the function
f ðxÞ ¼ G2x21G1x1G0; ð17Þ
and we are interested in roots of this function within the
interval (0, 1). We can see by inspection that G2 , 0, and
thus f(x)/ !N as x/ 6N, and there is a unique turning
point (given by 2G2x 1 G1 ¼ 0), which is a maximum. There
are 7 different ways in which f(x) can lie in relation to the
interval x 2[0, 1]: see Figure 1. From our previous argu-
ments, if f(0) . 0, then the C*p ¼ 0 ESS occurs, and if
f(1) , 0, then the C*p ¼ 1 ESS occurs. We are also interested
in intermediate equilibria that may occur when f(x) ¼ 0 for
any 0 , x , 1. Some of these equilibria are stable, and some
are not.
For cases (i), (ii), and (iii) of Figure 1, C*p ¼ 1 is the unique
ESS.
For case (iv), C*p ¼ 0 is the unique ESS.
For case (v), both C*p ¼ 0 and C*p ¼ 1 are ESSs, and there is
a single intermediate solution.
For case (vi), neither C*p ¼ 0 nor C*p ¼ 1 are ESSs, but there
is a single intermediate solution.
For case (vii), C*p ¼ 1 is an ESS, and there are 2 intermedi-
ate solutions.Which of these 7 cases occurs depends on
Figure 1
A generic depiction of the
possible values of the function
f(x) from Equation 17 over the
range [0, 1], which yields the
ESSs for each case, which are
summarized in Table 2.
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the values of G0, G1, and G2. For there to be any, x such
that f(x) ¼ 0, we need G12 . 4G0G2 (we ignore the highly
biologically unlikely case where parameter values are
such that G21 ¼ 4G0G2). This gives 2 roots Rs and Rl,
where Rs , Rl;
Rs ¼
!G11
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
G21 ! 4G0G2
q
2G2
ð18Þ
and
Rl ¼
!G1 !
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
G21 ! 4G0G2
q
2G2
: ð19Þ
We are interested in cases only where these roots fall within
(0, 1). In Appendix A, it is shown that 5 criteria determine which
of the 7 cases that a given set of parameter values falls into:
ðAÞ G21 . 4G0G2; ð20Þ
ðBÞ G0. 0; ð21Þ
ðCÞ G1. 0; ð22Þ
ðDÞ G11 2G2. 0; ð23Þ
ðEÞ G01G11G2. 0: ð24Þ
If (A) is not satisfied, then (regardless of whether the other
conditions are met or not), C*p ¼ 1 is the unique ESS [Figure
1, case (i)]. Hence, we concentrate on cases where (A) is met.
There are 16 possible combinations for the remaining 4 con-
ditions either to be met or not. These combinations are sum-
marized in Table 2.
From our previous arguments, it can be seen that where
they exist, the C*p ¼ 0 and C*p ¼ 1 equilibria are always evolu-
tionarily stable. We demonstrate the stability (or otherwise) of
all intermediate equilibria in Appendix B, which shows that
solutions that cross the y-axis when f(x) is decreasing (the
solutions associated with Rl) are unstable, whereas those for
which it is increasing (the solutions associated with Rs) are
stable. This means that the intermediate solutions in cases
(4) and (8) of Table 2 are unstable, as is the larger of the
intermediate solutions in case (12). All other intermediate
equilibria (i.e., cases 9, 11, and the lower value in 12) are
stable.
Hence, for a given set of parameter values, we find the ESS
value (or values) of C*p by calculating first G0, G1, and G2, then
each of the 5 criteria (A–E), and then consulting Table 1.
Where there is a stable intermediate value, then Rs needs to
be calculated using (18).
Once the ESS value of Cp is found, then the ESS value of Ch
can be found easily. If C*p ¼ 1, then C*h ¼ 0, if C*p ¼ 0 then
C*h ¼ 1, otherwise C*h ¼ 1! /. The relationship between spe-
cific parameter values and given ESSs needs to be explored
numerically.
PLAUSIBLE PARAMETER VALUES
In order to explore the model’s predictions further, we need
to understand how the values given to parameters translate
into ESS behaviors of parasite and host. For this, we need to
consider plausible parameter values.
First, we have the probabilities of parasitism (P) or egg loss
through external factors (E). These must both be nonnega-
tive, and E 1 P must be "1. We will assume default values of
0.15 for each. E varies strongly between species, populations,
and even years, so the value of 0.15 is plausible, but perhaps
more relevant to cavity nesters than open-nesting species
where higher predation rates may be expected (Nilsson
1986). P values of 0.15 are likely to be quite high for cuckoos,
or the common cuckoo at least. In most of Europe, its para-
sitism rate is 3–8% (Davies 2000; Payne 2005). However, we
adopt this value because it is approximately the maximum for
which our assumption (implicitly in point 2 of the model de-
scription) that the probability of 2 parasites selecting the same
nest is negligible can be justified (see Honza and Moskat 2005).
Table 2
If (A) is not satisfiedp, C*p ¼ 1 is the unique ESS
B C D E Figure 1
1 Y Y Y Y C*p ¼ 0 is the unique ESS (iv)
2 Y Y Y N This combination is impossible to achieve —
3 Y Y N Y C*p ¼ 0 is the unique ESS (iv)
4 Y Y N N Both C*p ¼ 0 and 1 are ESS 1 an intermediate unstable equilibrium (v)
5 Y N Y Y This combination is impossible to achieve —
6 Y N Y N This combination is impossible to achieve —
7 Y N N Y C*p ¼ 0 is the unique ESS (iv)
8 Y N N N Both C*p ¼ 0 and 1 are ESS 1 an intermediate unstable equilibrium (v)
9 N Y Y Y There is a stable intermediate equilibrium only (vi)
10 N Y Y N C*p ¼ 1 is the unique ESS (ii)
11 N Y N Y These is a stable intermediate equilibrium only (vi)
12 N Y N N C*p ¼ 1 is an ESS 1 2 intermediate equilibria, one stable, the other not (vii)
13 N N Y Y This combination is impossible to achieve —
14 N N Y N This combination is impossible to achieve —
15 N N N Y This combination is impossible to achieve —
16 N N N N C*p ¼ 1 is the unique ESS (iii)
Where (A) is met, there are 16 possible combinations for 4 conditions either to be met (denoted ‘‘Y’’) or not met (denoted ‘‘N’’). These
combinations are described along with the possible solutions that each allows and the part of Figure 1 that each relates to.
26 Behavioral Ecology
Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/beheco/article-abstract/19/1/22/227461/Host-life-history-strategies-and-the-evolution-of
by guest
on 19 September 2017
The value (B) of a full brood to a parent (relative to the
value of a single chick) is approximately the brood size (mod-
ified by a factor to account for, e.g., between-sib competition),
so for small passerine birds, we might expect this to be be-
tween 2 and 6. We will assume a default value of 4.
There are also 2 parameters related to competition between
a parasite and the host’s chicks. We assume that the parasite’s
fitness would be higher if it did not suffer competition from
the host chicks, and / is the fitness value of a parasite raised in
competition relative to one raised alone. This value must be
between 0 and 1, and we will assume a default value of 0.7.
This is likely to be a high estimate both from within-species
evidence and between-species evidence (e.g., Hauber 2003a,
2003b).
We also assume that competition with the parasite reduces
the fitness values of a brood of host chicks by a multiplicative
factor 0 , c , 1. Again, this value must be between 0 and 1,
and we will assume a default value of 0.5 (see Hoover [2003],
for data from a prothonotary warbler, Prothonotaria citrea, pop-
ulation parasitized by brown-headed cowbirds).
Lastly, we have the host adult survival probabilities, such
that
lbp " lb " ls " ld;
and
lbp " lp " ls " ld:
Generally, parasite hosts are not long-lived birds so we assume
default values of ld ¼ 0.45, with lb being 0.35, along with
values of 0.4 for ls, 0.35 for lp, and 0.3 for lbp. The mean
survival value for British cuckoo hosts (i.e., robin Erithacus
rubecula 0.419, wren Troglodytes troglodytes 0.319, meadow pipit
Anthus pratensis 0.543, pied wagtail Motacilla alba 0.485, and
dunnock Prunella modularis 0.473) raising their own unpara-
sitized broods lb is 0.448 (data from British Trust for Orni-
thology BirdFacts database: http://blx1.bto.org/birdfacts/
index.htm), suggesting that our assumed default values are
at least plausible.
NUMERICAL RESULTS
We varied each parameter in turn, keeping the remaining at
their default values. For the default values, the ESS is for hosts
never to desert single chicks (Ch ¼ 0) and for parasites always
to kill (Cp ¼ 1).
Figure 2a shows the effect of varying B, the value of a full
clutch to a host parent (relative to the value of a single host
chick). There is no change in behavior until B exceeds a crit-
ical value (just below 6). Above this value, the host begins to
desert, switching to its intermediate strategy of deserting a sin-
gle chick with probability (1 ! /). This makes sense because
as B increases, the value of future broods, relative to a current
single chick, increases, and there comes a point where the
fitness benefits to the host of greater survival from desertion
exceed the costs of potentially deserting one of the host’s own
chicks. This strategy by the hosts makes killing less attractive to
parasites, and so the rate at which parasites kill nest mates
reduces from one. As B increases beyond this threshold, the
host’s strategy remains the same but (because increasing B
makes desertion ever more attractive to hosts), the parasite
must compensate hosts by reducing its rate of killing, so re-
ducing the chance that a single chick in the nest is actually
parasitic and hence of no fitness value to the hosts.
Figure 2b shows the effect of varying E, the probability that
a host’s brood is reduced to a single individual, through an
external event. We find on decreasing E from the default value
that there is a critical point at which the host switches to its
intermediate strategy of sometimes deserting singletons. As E
decreases, so the likelihood that a singleton is actually the
host’s own chick and not a parasite decreases, and so deser-
tion becomes more attractive. At this point, the parasite’s
probability of killing declines from one, and continues to de-
cline with decreasing E, as the parasite’s strategy has to change
to compensate for the increased attractiveness of desertion to
the host as E (and thus, the chance that a single remaining
chick is not a parasite) becomes smaller still.
Figure 2c shows no change in behavior with variation in P,
the probability of parasitism. Based on the previous 2 figures,
one might expect that there would be an upper critical value
of P such that for values beyond this the high chance that
a single individual was a parasite would induce the hosts to
switch to desertion. This does not occur, firstly because there
is still a chance that a singleton is the host’s own chick (and
therefore there is a benefit to not deserting), but also when
parasitism is very high in this generation it will also be very
high in the next generation, making future potential breed-
ing attempts less valuable, and so desertion less attractive.
However, it should be remembered that our model is likely
to become unreliable when P is much higher than our base-
line value of 0.15 because then our assumption that nests
never receive more than one parasitic egg becomes difficult
to justify. The arguments above do suggest, however, that our
predictions are likely to be insensitive to the specific value of
P, providing it is sufficiently low that this assumption is valid.
The cost of competition with the host’s chicks to the para-
site / does not appear in G0, G1, or G2 and so has no effect on
which of the 3 strategy types is adopted by host and parasite.
If, however, the values of other parameters mean that the in-
termediate strategy type is adopted, then the value of / does
have a quantitative effect on the strategy. This can be under-
stood by thinking of the interaction as a game in which the
host makes an initial choice and then the parasite chooses
what to play based on the host’s choice. There are only 3
stable host possibilities. If hosts never desert, then the parasite
does best by always killing, irrespective of the value of /. Sim-
ilarly, if hosts always desert, then parasites should never kill,
regardless of the / value. However, for the intermediate solu-
tion, an interesting phenomenon occurs: low / means that
a parasite does worse by not killing host young but has no
direct effect on the host. There seems to be a paradox here
in that one might expect that the parasite would then choose
to kill more often. However, this would then harm the host, so
as / gets smaller the host chooses a higher desertion proba-
bility, which in turn deters the parasite from killing. Thus, the
value of / has no effect on the parasite strategy (although it
directly affects its payoff) but changes the host strategy (al-
though it does not directly affect its payoff).
The cost of competition with a parasite to the host c does
affect both G0 and G1. However, when all the other parameters
take their default values, then the strategy adopted is indepen-
dent of the value of c. When c takes its default value, parasites
always kill and hosts never desert. Changing c has no effect on
the host’s decision because it affects neither the value of the
current brood (with one chick only) nor the future broods
(which will contain either one chick or a full clutch but never
a full clutch and a parasite—because the parasite always kills).
Changing c does not affect the parasite’s decision to kill; it
should always kill because the host never deserts. Changing c
could have an effect on strategy if the default parameter val-
ues lead to a different strategy pair but has no effect on this
particular strategy pair. For example, in Figure 2d we increase
the survival probabilities such that ld ¼ 0.75, lb ¼ 0.6, ls ¼
0.65, lp ¼ 0.4, and lbp ¼ 0.3. Now, we see that the strategy
throughout is the intermediate one where the host sometimes
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Figure 2
The effect of altering parameter values on the ESS for both parasites and hosts. The probability of the parasite killing the host’s eggs or chicks,
Cp, is given by the ‘‘plus’’ symbols, that is, Cp ¼ 1 means the parasite should always kill; the probability that the host will desert a single chick, Ch,
is given by the circular symbols, that is, Ch ¼ 1 means the host should always desert if it finds only a single individual in its nest. Unless otherwise
stated, the default parameter values are used except for the variable on the x-axis: these values are P ¼ 0.15, E ¼ 0.15, B ¼ 4, / ¼ 0.7, c ¼ 0.5,
ld ¼ 0.45, lb ¼ 0.35, ls ¼ 0.4, lp ¼ 0.35, and lbp ¼ 0.3. We show the consequences of varying (a) the value of a brood (B); (b) the probability of
brood reduction through an external event (E); (c) the probability of parasitism (P); (d) the effect of the parasite on the host brood (c) for the
default values except ld ¼ 0.75, lb ¼ 0.6, ls ¼ 0.65, lp ¼ 0.4, and lbp ¼ 0.3; (e) the between-breeding-attempt survival of the host, with all 5
default survivorship probabilities being modified by the same additive value (h, see Numerical Results); (f) the probability of surviving after
desertion (ld) when all other parameters take default values; (g) the probability of surviving after raising a fully unparasitized brood (lb) when
the other survivorship probabilities are ld ¼ 0.75, ls ¼ 0.65, lp ¼ 0.4, and lbp ¼ 0.5lb; (h) the probability of surviving after raising a lone
parasitic chick (lp) when the other survivorship probabilities are ld ¼ 0.75, ls ¼ 0.65, lb ¼ 0.35, and lbp ¼ 0.5lp; (i) the probability of surviving
after raising a lone parasitic chick (lp) when the other survivorship probabilities take the default values except that lbp ¼ 0.5lp (j) the value of
a full brood (B) for parameter values ld ¼ 0.77, ls ¼ 0.75, lb ¼ 0.35, lp ¼ 0.35, lbp ¼ 0.3, E ¼ 0.2, P ¼ 0.78, c ¼ 0.2, and / ¼ 0.5.
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deserts. Now, as c increases, the form of this strategy changes
as the frequency of killing by the parasite declines. This occurs
because increasing c makes desertion more attractive to the
host because it increases the value of potential future broods.
In order to compensate for this (and avoid the host switching
to deserting all singletons), the parasite has to increase the
value of the current brood by reducing the frequency of kill-
ing (so increasing the likelihood that the current singleton is
the host’s own offspring).
We can explore the effect of host longevity by adding an
offset (h) to each of the 5 default survival probabilities, with
a higher value of h indicating generally higher between-breed-
ing attempt survivorship of a longer lived host. Increasing
survival rates in this way should increase the value of future
reproduction relative to the current single chick in the nest
and should favor increased desertion rates by the host. This is
what we see in Figure 2e, with the switch to the intermediate
host strategy of sometimes rejecting occurring when the offset
exceeds a value of around 0.2; for values above this the para-
site’s probability of chick-killing begins to decline, for similar
reasons to those discussed previously. However, with high
enough survivorship the rate of killing is driven down to 0,
and the system flips to the unusual strategy combination of
hosts that always desert and parasites that never kill. Notice
that this only happens when survivorship is very high, such
that the probability of surviving to the next breeding attempt
is between 0.95 and 0.8. These values are generally higher
than experienced by any host species. Essentially similar argu-
ments explain the model predictions as we vary only the prob-
ability of survival after desertion in Figure 2f.
We next turn to exploring the consequences of increasing
the costs of raising a full brood of chicks (by decreasing lb and
lbp). We would expect that decreasing lb reduces the value of
future reproductive events and so makes desertion less attrac-
tive. Because the strategy at the default values is never to
desert, we would not expect this to induce a change in strat-
egy. However, increasing lb might be expected to induce
a strategy change by making desertion more attractive, al-
though for the range of parameter values possible for lb we
see no change in strategy. This occurs no matter the value
given to lbp, which is not surprising because as current para-
site strategy involves always killing, so the situation of raising
a full brood and a parasite together would generally very
rarely occur through mutation effects. If we change the values
as before such that ld ¼ 0.75, ls ¼ 0.65, lp ¼ 0.4, and lbp ¼
0.5lb, then the intermediate strategy is predicted for the en-
tire range of plausible values of lb (Figure 2g). However, as
lb increases, desertion becomes more attractive to the host,
and so the parasite’s probability of killing has to decline to
increase the average value of the current single chick. Con-
versely, when we vary the cost of rearing a parasite in Figure 2h
(ld ¼ 0.75, ls ¼ 0.65, lb ¼ 0.35, and lbp ¼ 0.5lp), we see that
Figure 2, continued
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increasing the likelihood of survival after raising a parasite
makes desertion less attractive and so allows the parasite to
increase its likelihood of killing. Although it did not occur in
Figure 2g,h, changing survivorship probabilities can induce
a change in the form of the predicted strategy pair. If we
switch back to the default parameter values, except lbp ¼
0.5lp, then Figure 2i shows that as the cost of rearing a parasite
increases (i.e., lp declines), so desertion becomes more attrac-
tive to the host, which switches from never deserting to the
intermediate desertion strategy. Further declines in lp cause
the parasite to decline its likelihood of chick-killing.
Another prediction of the analysis was that coexisting ESSs
could occur (cases [v] and [vii] from Table 2). That is, the ESS
shown by a particular system would be dependent not only on
the current values given to parameters (the current ecology)
but also on the history of the system. Thus, 2 currently iden-
tical populations could show quite different behaviors because
they have different evolutionary histories. An example of such
a situation can be seen in Figure 2j. At low B values, there is
a single ESS with parasites always killing and hosts never de-
serting. However, between B values of around 4 and 7, this ESS
coexists with the intermediate ESS. For higher B values than
this, then the intermediate ESS becomes the only stable state.
Extensive numerical exploration suggests that coexisting ESSs
are relatively uncommonly predicted and only occur when the
probability of parasitism has unrealistically high values. To
generate Figure 2j, the following parameter values were used:
ld ¼ 0.77, ls ¼ 0.75, lb ¼ 0.35, lp ¼ 0.35, and lbp ¼ 0.3; E ¼
0.2, P ¼ 0.78, c ¼ 0.2, and / ¼ 0.5. Thus, hosts are parasitized
on 78% of occasions and find a single chick in their nest on
98% of occasions. If the parasitism rate is dropped to even
75%, then the multiple ESS situation disappears.
DISCUSSION
We have analyzed a model that describes how hosts might
respond to the presence of a brood parasite in their nest. Most
previous work has considered this problem by considering
a coevolutionary arms race between the parasite and its host,
in which the cost of exploitation by the parasite selects hosts
that mount defences against parasitism and these, in turn,
select parasites that can outwit their hosts (Rothstein 1990;
Davies 2000; but see Grim et al. 2003). The principal costs
of parasitism suffered by the host are sustained soon after
the brood parasitic nestling hatches, when it might kill the
host young. In general, when the nestling parasite is virulent,
hosts are more likely to exhibit defences against parasitism,
and they are most in evidence at the egg-laying stage of the
breeding cycle (Davies 2000). Host adaptations for recogniz-
ing and rejecting foreign chicks are relatively rare (Lotem
1993; Langmore et al. 2003; Grim 2006a) and are most likely
to be seen if parasites routinely breach the host defences
mounted at the egg-stage (Planque` et al. 2002; Langmore
et al. 2003; Grim 2006a).
Our different approach is to focus on the life history of the
host (e.g., Soler 2002, Lyon and Eadie 2004). Whereas pre-
vious work has focused on host behavior during interactions
with intraspecific brood parasites (Lyon and Eadie 2004), or
during chick rearing (Soler 2002), our interest is the interac-
tion of parasitism with life-history parameters not directly re-
lated to the nestling period, such as longevity. In our model,
when hosts can gain greater fitness from future broods than
they can from the continued care of a current single nestling,
then their best strategy is always to give up on the current
breeding attempt, regardless of whether the single chick is
their own or a brood parasite. After hatching, the parasite
must choose whether or not to kill host young, balancing
the benefits of becoming the sole beneficiary of parental care
against the risk that, as a single chick in the nest, it will be
abandoned. When the risk of desertion is sufficiently high, the
parasite does not kill host young, in order to guarantee its
continued care.
Using the ESS approach, our model found 3 types of equi-
libria at which cuckoo and host strategies were evolutionarily
stable. In the first equilibrium pair, the host never abandons
a single nestling and the brood parasite always kills host
young. This matches the behaviors shown by the reed warbler
and the common cuckoo, respectively (Grim 2006b). Reed
Warblers have never been observed to abandon single nest-
lings, even when broods of their own are manipulated to con-
tain just one chick (Davies et al. 1998), and common cuckoos
routinely evict host young. It is likely that this pair of strategies
also describes the interactions of the common cuckoo and
other hosts. It is not uncommon, for example, for dunnocks
to raise single nestlings (Davies 1986). These strategies
could also accurately describe other cuckoo and honeyguide
species that routinely kill host nestlings (but see below for an
exception).
It is harder to find examples to match the second pair of
stable strategies identified by our model, in which the host
always abandons single nestlings and the parasite does not kill
host young, and our numerical analysis indicated that this
should be by far the least common of the 3 strategy pairs
predicted by the model. Among hosts of the more benign
brood parasites, there is little indication that the absence of
chick-killing has evolved in response to the threat of subse-
quent desertion by hosts. For example, magpie, P. pica, hosts
continue to care for great spotted cuckoo, C. glandarius, young
long after it has caused all their own chicks to starve to death
(Soler JJ and Soler M 2000), and the same appears to be true
of eastern phoebes, Sayornis phoebe, and other victims of the
brown-headed cowbird (Hauber 2003a). Similarly, hosts of
Vidua parasites willingly raise both single parasites and single
host young (Payne et al. 2001; Schuetz 2005). Thus, there are
numerous examples in which parasites do not kill host chicks
and hosts do not abandon single nestlings, a situation that
should never be an ESS according to our model. Perhaps in
these host–parasite systems, the parasite has yet to select for
changes in the host’s life-history strategies (see below).
In the third stable equilibrium identified by our model, the
likelihood that hosts will desert single chicks varies between
0 and 1, as does the propensity of cuckoos to kill host young.
The behavior of the superb fairy-wren, Malurus cyaneus, the
primary host of the Horsfield’s bronze-cuckoo in south east-
ern Australia, is consistent with the model in that it abandons
roughly 35% of all single nestlings it is given, whether they are
Horsfield’s bronze-cuckoos or single host chicks (Langmore
et al. 2003). There is considerable variation among host fe-
males in their inclination to desert the nest (Langmore et al.
2003), but the Horsfield’s Bronze-cuckoo nestling, by con-
trast, consistently evicts host young within 48 h of hatching
(Payne RB and Payne LL 1998). Although the behavioral data
superficially resemble an equilibrium predicted by the model,
other explanations are possible. For example, perhaps nes-
tling desertion is a coevolved strategy of defence against par-
asitism, driven by recognition of foreign offspring rather than
a pre-existing life-history strategy in the host.
It might be argued that the deaths of host chicks that re-
sult from the presence of a brood parasite in the nest, but
which do not result from chick-killing directly, also match
the conditions for this equilibrium. Several of the more be-
nign brood parasites are known to contribute to causing host
nestling mortality, even though they have no means of evict-
ing or killing young directly. Instead, their competitive su-
periority (e.g., Redondo 1993; Soler et al. 1995; Lichtenstein
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and Sealy 1998) deprives the host young of food and results
in their death through starvation. In these instances, known
in detail for the brown-headed cowbird and the great spot-
ted cuckoo, at least, hosts routinely accept single offspring,
but the chance that host young will die varies between 0 and
1. The predictions of our model suggest the possibility that
in addition to choosing not to kill nest mates directly, para-
sites might sometimes adopt a ‘‘prudent’’ strategy of not
monopolizing food to the point of starving all the nest
mates.
In this paper, we effectively assume that occurrences of par-
asitism (P) and chick loss through other processes (E) are
sufficiently small that the possibility of both occurring simul-
taneously can be ignored. If this is not the case, the same
modeling system can still be used, but then the order of these
events is important; if both occur and parasitism happens
second, then the parasite will survive, whereas if it happens
first, then it may not. To tackle such a system, one would need
to consider a more detailed and flexible distribution of egg
survival after natural destruction. We decided for reasons of
simplicity to ignore such effects in this paper. However, it is
likely that the predictions that we make will hold for higher
values of E and P as all parasites will be affected by this irre-
spective of strategy, and we can get a good approximate model
of the system by considering ‘‘effective’’ levels of parasitism
and natural destruction adjusting for events up to the point
that strategic choices are made (e.g., the effective level of
parasitism would be the proportion of nests with surviving
parasites). Another potential complication is that, for larger
values of P, there is a nonnegligible probability of 2 (or more)
parasites occurring in a single nest, and then the actions of
the competing parasites are again more complex, and the
strategies played will affect different individuals differently.
Thus, the model is more sensitive to high values of P than it
is to high values of E. The predictions are only likely to go
seriously wrong for parasitism levels much higher than the
conservatively chosen 0.15, however.
Another implicit assumption of our current model is that
individuals targeted by brood parasites in 1 year are no more
likely than other individuals to be targeted in future years
(Hauber et al. 2004). If this is untrue, as it may well be in
some systems, then this would make nest desertion a less at-
tractive option to hosts than our current model predicts be-
cause the value of future nesting attempts will be relatively
decreased. There may also be systems in which parasites kill
only some of the host’s offspring. Such an occurrence would
not invalidate the results considered here but would enhance
selection pressure for chick discrimination by the host adult.
Similarly, if survival between reproductive attempts declined
with age, one would expect older individuals to be less willing
to desert their current nest.
There is an interesting asymmetry in the type of game be-
tween host and parasite explored in our model, in that all
parasites experience a host but not all hosts experience a par-
asite (a rare enemy effect, sensu Dawkins and Krebs 1979).
Thus, the strategic choice of behavior by the host has more
influence on the reward to the parasite, than the choice of
behavior by the parasite has on the reward to the host. Solu-
tions involve the parasite getting the optimal strategic interac-
tion between host and parasite. Consider a single interaction
if a parasite is present, not taking into account future rewards.
If the parasite’s strategy is known, the optimal strategy for the
host is to desert if the parasite kills host young and not to
desert if it does not. On the other hand, the optimal strategy
for a parasite, if the host’s strategy is known, is to kill host
young if the host will not desert and not to kill if it will desert.
When future rewards are taken into account by the host, the 2
pure solutions are ‘‘eject and not desert’’ or ‘‘not eject and
desert,’’ which are again favorable to the parasite and not to
the host. Thus, parasites will tend to do better in a host pop-
ulation where they have low penetration, for example, if they
have many potential hosts. Of course, evolution works at the
level of the individual so that such a situation may not be
selected for even if it is the ‘‘group’’ interest. For example, if
there is just one potential host, the population of parasites will
evolve with the population of hosts, perhaps to some stable
level where penetration is high.
Finally, just as in previous work (e.g., Soler 2002; Lyon and
Eadie 2004), a key feature of the model presented here is that
host responses to the brood parasitic young depend on the
host’s life history. But host life-history strategies might them-
selves evolve in response to parasitism. Previous work has
shown that host clutch sizes evolve in response to exploitation
by brood parasites (e.g., Lyon 1998; Soler JJ and Soler M 2000;
Soler et al. 2001; Hauber 2003b), so other life-history traits
might similarly be affected. It is possible, for example, that
hosts might evolve a life-history strategy that favors the aban-
donment of single young after a prolonged history of interac-
tion with a chick-killing brood parasite. According to our
model, an increase in B by hosts will then favor the evolution
of single chick desertion.
This raises the possibility of an intriguing dichotomy in the
way that coevolution has shaped host responses to brood para-
sites. It could be that those exploited by chick-killing parasites
mount defences involving recognition and rejection (Davies
2000), whereas those exploited by the more benign brood
parasites have altered their life-history strategies (Lyon 1998;
Soler JJ and Soler M 2000; Soler et al. 2001; Hauber 2003b).
The conventional view is that the degree of virulence shown
by the brood parasite is responsible for the contrast in host
response. Our model suggests that the causal arrow can be
reversed: perhaps a change in host life-history strategies can
cause a virulent brood parasite to become more benign.
APPENDIX A
The relationship between the 5 conditions A–E and Figure 1
The 7 cases in Figure 1 are determined by their relationships
to the roots of Equation 16. In (i), there is no such root
occurring if G21,4G0G2 (condition A
C). All other cases require
A to occur with G21.4G0G2, when there are 2 real roots. Case
(ii) requires both roots larger than 1, so that
Rs ¼
!G11
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
G21 ! 4G0G2
q
2G2
. 10
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
G21 ! 4G0G2
q
, 2G21G1:
ðA1Þ
In conjunction with condition A, this equates to 2G21G1.0
(condition D) and G21 ! 4G0G2,ð2G21G1Þ20G01G11G2,0
(condition EC).
Given that G2 , 0, these also imply G1 . 0 (condition C)
and G0 , 0 (condition B
C).
Similar inequalities between either Rl or Rs and either 0 or
1 were used to establish the other conditions. In fact, there is
a natural meaning to each of the 5 conditions, which makes
it easy to see which corresponds to which case. A is the con-
dition for the quadratic equation to have real roots, B is the
condition that the value of this quadratic function at 0 is
positive, that is, f(0) . 0, C is the condition that the slope
of the function at 0 is positive (f#(0) . 0), D is the condition
that this slope is positive at 1, that is, f#(1) . 0, and E is the
condition that f(1) . 0. So, for example, from Figure 1 case
(ii), we can see that neither B nor E occur but both C and
D do.
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Case (iii) requires both roots be ,0. Case (iv) requires the
larger root be .1 and the smaller root ,0. For case (v), we
need the larger root between 0 and 1 and the smaller root,0.
Case (vi) requires the smaller root to be between 0 and 1 and
the larger root .1. Finally, case (vii) requires both roots to be
between 0 and 1.
The full breakdown of Figure 1 in relation to the 4 other
conditions is, thus, as follows (remembering that case (i) is
A ‘‘No,’’ and all other cases require A ‘‘Yes’’). Case (iv) B and
E ‘‘Yes’’; case (v) B ‘‘Yes,’’ E ‘‘No’’; case (vi) B ‘‘No,’’ E ‘‘Yes.’’
All other cases involve B and E ‘‘No.’’ In addition, they need
(ii) C and D ‘‘Yes’’; (iii) C and D ‘‘No’’; (vii) C ‘‘Yes’’ and D
‘‘No.’’
APPENDIX B
Stability of intermediate solutions where 0 , C*p, 1
Suppose that we have a population almost entirely composed
of individuals playing the equilibrium strategies ðC*p ;C*h Þ, but
we have a small fraction (x) of mutant parasites playing a dif-
ferent strategy (Cp), and a small fraction (y) of mutant hosts
playing a different strategy (Ch). We need to consider the
rewards to hosts and parasites in mixed populations and so
must extend our previous notation. The reward to a host play-
ing strategy Ch in the above mixed population can be written
RðCh; xCp; ð1! xÞC*p Þ and the reward to a parasite playing Cp
in this population can be written SðCp; yCh; ð1! yÞC*h Þ. In fact,
in the following working, all populations are of the above
form, with 2 strategy types present in both hosts and mutants,
and for simplicity, we will just write R(Ch) for RðCh; xCp;
ð1! xÞC*p Þ and S(Cp) for SðCp; yCh; ð1! yÞC*h Þ in all of the
following. The equilibrium will certainly be unstable if we
can find a pair of mutant strategies where both RðChÞ.
RðC*h Þ and SðCpÞ.SðC*p Þ.
In this case, we have C*h ¼ 1! /, and any parasite faces
a host using strategies Ch and C*h with probabilities y and
1 ! y, respectively. Using this, it is easy to show that
SðCpÞ ! SðC*p Þ ¼ ðC*p ! CpÞðCh ! C*h Þy: ðA2Þ
Hence, the parasite mutants do better than the resident indi-
viduals if
ðC*p ! CpÞðCh ! C*h Þ. 0: ðA3Þ
To consider the host mutants, we can use the relation that
intermediate equilibria can only occur if bc ! ad ¼ 0. That
is, solutions of the form ð0,C*p,1;C*h ¼ 1! /Þ can only oc-
cur at the roots of
G01G1C
*
p 1G2ðC*p Þ2 ¼ 0: ðA4Þ
In such a population, the payoff to an individual of the main
population is
RðC*h Þ ¼ ½ð1!P !EÞB1PcB1E!PcBðxCp1ð1!xÞC*p Þ!EC*h '=
½1! lb1Pðlb ! lbpÞ1Eðlb ! lsÞ1EC*h ðls ! ldÞ
1PðxCp1 ð1! xÞC*p Þððlbp ! lpÞ1C*h ðlp ! ldÞÞ'
ðA5Þ
and the payoff to the mutants is
RðChÞ ¼ ½ð1!P!EÞB1PcB1E!PcBðxCp1ð1!xÞC*p Þ!ECh'=
½1! lb1Pðlb ! lbpÞ1Eðlb ! lsÞ1EChðls ! ldÞ
1PðxCp1 ð1! xÞC*p Þððlbp ! lpÞ1Chðlp ! ldÞÞ':
ðA6Þ
With some algebra, we can show that
RðChÞ ! RðC*h Þ}! ðC*p ! CpÞðCh ! C*h ÞdpðC*p Þx!
x2ðC*p ! CpÞ2ðCh ! C*h ÞP2cBðlp ! ldÞ;
ðA7Þ
where we define
dpðCÞ ¼ ddCpðG2C
2
p 1G1Cp1G0ÞatCp¼C ¼ 2CG21G1: ðA8Þ
Ignoring small terms in x2, we thus obtain RðChÞ . RðC*h Þ,
providing
ðC*p ! CpÞðCh ! C*h ÞdpðC*p Þ, 0: ðA9Þ
Thus, if dpðC*p Þ,0, then both parasite and host mutants do
better if Equation A9 (and so Equation A2) is satisfied, and so
the equilibrium is unstable. From the definition of dpðC*p Þ,
this means that any equilibrium where the function f(x) is
declining (with increasing x) when f(x) ¼ 0, is unstable. This
makes several of the equilibria identified in Table 1 unstable.
We now turn to the case where dpðC*p Þ.0. Under standard
replicator dynamics, from Equations (A2) and (A9), we can
describe changes in the frequencies of the mutants over time
(t) by
@x
@t
¼ xyk1ðC*p ! CpÞðCh ! C*h Þ; ðA10Þ
@y
@t
¼ !xydpðC*p Þk2ðC*p ! CpÞðCh ! C*h Þ ðA11Þ
for positive constants k1 and k2. This means that for small
mutant invasions either the mutant host or the mutant para-
site will be eliminated but the other will persist (one of the 2
above derivatives is positive, the other negative for given mu-
tant types). We can see from the above that
d
dt
ðdpðC*p Þk2x1 k1yÞ ¼ 0: ðA12Þ
If the mutant frequencies start at (x0, y0), then due to (A12),
the end point of the evolution is either ðx01k1y0=dpðC*p Þk2; 0Þ
or ð0; dpðC*p Þk2x0=k11y0Þ: Thus, there is no evolutionary pres-
sure for very small mutant groups. Subsequent mutations
and/or drift may make the mutant proportion larger, but it
will always finish with mutants of one type only.
What happens when there is a mutant proportion that is
still small (but far larger than the initial mutation size) and
a mutation of the other type occurs? If the proportion of
host mutants has reached the larger value, then the popu-
lation starts at (xs, y0) where xs is small and thus finishes
approximately at ðk1y0=dpðC*p Þk2; 0Þ or (0, y0). There is either
no change or a switch to this other mutant with the size of
the mutant population as given above.
If the proportion of parasite mutants has reached the larger
value, then the population starts at (x0, ys) where ysis small. How-
ever, the differential equation for y has amended form because
the initial average parasite strategy is x0Cp1ð1! x0ÞC*p so that
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@y
@t
¼ !xydpðx0Cp 1 ð1! x0ÞC*p Þk2ðC*p ! CpÞðCh ! C*h Þ
ðA13aÞ
if the above switch does not occur or
@y
@t
’! xydpð0:5x0Cp1 ð1! 0:5x0ÞC*p Þk2ðC*p ! CpÞðCh ! C*h Þ
ðA13bÞ
if the switch does occur, because we must consider the average
parasite strategy as it moves from x0Cp1ð1! x0ÞC*p to C*p if the
switch occurs, and the fixed value at x0Cp1ð1! x0ÞC*p otherwise.
So the population finishes approximately at ðx0; 0Þ or ð0; dp
ð0:5x0Cp1ð1! 0:5x0ÞC*p Þk2x0=k1Þ: There is either no change
or a switch to this other mutant with the size of the mutant
population as given above.
Suppose that parasite mutations increase or decrease the
current value of their strategy Cp by a fixed amount ac, and
host mutations do the same with amount ah. If different and
multiple mutants are allowed, then the following analysis
would be more complex, but not qualitatively different, pro-
vided that mutations of both host and parasite could occur in
both directions. The key feature in showing stability is the
average mutant strategy, and the simple form of function A8
indicates that stability should occur for various such mutation
possibilities. Suppose further that the population starts at
ð0; y0Þ. Mutations will either leave the population where it is,
or move to ðk1y0=dpð0:5x0Cp1ð1! 0:5x0ÞC*p Þk2; 0Þ; so eventu-
ally this move will occur. Now mutations will either leave the
population where it is or move it to
ð0; dpð0:5x0Cp1 ð1! 0:5x0ÞC*p Þðk2k1y0=dpðC*p Þk2Þ=k1Þ
¼ ð0; dpð0:5x0Cp1 ð1! 0:5x0ÞC*p Þy0=dpðC*p ÞÞ; ðA14Þ
(where here x0 ¼ k1y0=dpðC*p Þk2) which will thus eventually
occur (but the host mutant value of Ch will be the other
side of the equilibrium strategy). The next mutation must sim-
ilarly eventually move the population to ðk1y0dpð0:5x0Cp1
ð1! 0:5x0ÞC*p Þ=d2pk2; 0Þ (but the parasite mutant strategy will
be the other side of the equilibrium, at 2C*p ! Cp). The next
move returns the population to the same mutant mix as at the
start but with a new frequency
ð0; dpð0:5x0Cp1 ð1! 0:5x0ÞC*p Þdpð!0:5x0Cp
1 ð11 0:5x0ÞC*p Þy0=d2pðC*p ÞÞ: ðA15Þ
The population has moved closer to the equilibrium if and
only if
dpð0:5x0Cp1 ð1! 0:5x0ÞC*p Þdpð!0:5x0Cp
1 ð11 0:5x0ÞC*p Þ=d2pðC*p Þ, 1: ðA16Þ
By substituting the result from A8, A16 reduces to
ð2G2C*p 1G11 x0G2ðCp ! C*p ÞÞð2G2C*p 1G1 ! x0G2ðCp ! C*p ÞÞ
ð2G2C*p 1G1Þ2
¼ 1! ðCp ! C
*
p Þ2x20G22
ð2G2C*p 1G1Þ2
, 1; ðA17Þ
which is clearly true. We thus have the required result. There
is pressure toward the equilibrium value once the mutant size
becomes sufficiently large (but still small). This equilibrium
can thus be considered stable, although small oscillations from
this equilibrium will occur and persist for periods of time.
In summary, we can delineate those internal equilibria that
are evolutionarily stable and those that are not.
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